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ABSTRACT:
We construct a stylised macro-model with goods and labour market imperfections to show
that the economy can rationally operate at an inefficient, or ‘low-effort’, equilibrium in the
neighbourhood of which the relationship between output and unemployment is, in contrast to
Okun’s Law, positive.  We use the Kalman-filter approach allowing for trends, cyclical
changes and breaks to examine data from the G7 countries over period 1960-2001, and find
that only German data strongly favour a persistent negative relationship between the level of
output and rate of unemployment.  Our results suggest that circumstances exist in which
market imperfections pose serious obstacles to the smooth working of expansionary and/or
stabilization policies.
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11. Introduction
In the last few decades, industrialised nations have been subjected to a variety of external and
policy-induced demand shocks while simultaneously experiencing significant changes in
their labour productivity and employment.  Meanwhile, governments have been concerned to
maintain a balance between implementing those policies which protect workers against job
losses by reducing the hardship of unemployment and those which restrain the unemployment
rate.  However, as Lindbeck (1992) warns, unless we have a clear understanding of how such
policies work, their implementation may produce unexpected consequences: "In the context
of a nonmarket-clearing labour market, it is certainly reasonable to regard unemployment, in
particular highly persistent unemployment, as a major macroeconomic distortion. There is
therefore a potential case for policy actions, provided such actions do not create more
problems than they solve. Experience in many countries suggests that the latter reservation is
not trivial."
In this paper we focus on one such case by examining the relationship between the
level of output and the rate of unemployment.  The common belief regarding this relationship
is dominated by Okun’s Law, which predicts a negative relationship between changes in
these variables.  Our aim is to explore whether it is possible for an economy to deviate from
this in a systematic way.  More specifically, we ask whether there are circumstances in which
a rise in the rate of unemployment can lead to an increase the level of output.  We develop a
theoretical model that shows such a result can be obtained when labour and goods markets
operate under certain (plausible) conditions.  Clearly, such departures from ‘standard’ results
are expected when models are modified to deviate from competitive markets by allowing for
particular types of rigidities or distortions.  Typical examples in the related literature are the
introduction of ‘efficiency wages’,  ‘unionisation’,  ‘wage contracts’, and ‘unemployment
insurance’.  However, as far as we are aware, only studies on the latter topic have reported
2results which show that changes in output and unemployment can be positively correlated.
For instance, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) focus on the effect of raising unemployment
insurance within a search model and conclude that more generous welfare programmes can in
fact raise output and welfare despite giving rise to a higher unemployment.
Given that we are interested in examining the effect of a typical macroeconomic
policy – e.g. the rise in government expenditure financed by taxes – in the presence of
relevant market imperfections, in this paper we construct a model in the tradition of
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).  The model allows for a distortion in the labour market
through incorporating a variant of the efficiency wage hypothesis whereby involuntary
unemployment gives rise to externalities that could be exploited by economic agents; price-
setting firms use high or rising unemployment as a device to deter shirking.  The novelty of
the variant used in this paper is that, unlike the existing models in which a worker’s effort
level is discrete and can assume either a low or a high value, it allows a worker’s optimal
effort supply to be a continuous function of its determinants.  These determinants include the
real wage, unemployment insurance and rate of unemployment in the economy. In such
circumstances the supply side is shown to exhibit a non-linearity which is adequately
captured by a humped-shape relationship between output and unemployment rate.  It follows
that the economy can, at any point in time, be in one of the three possible states with regard
to the effort level.  The standard case, in line with Okun’s Law in which output and
unemployment rate are negatively related, occurs in the ‘high-effort’ state where the
economy can be said to be operating ‘efficiently’.  In this case, to raise the level of output in
response to a rise in aggregate demand firms need to employ more workers.  The opposite
case occurs in the ‘low-effort’ state in which the economy may be said to be operating
‘inefficiently’.  In this situation a higher level of output can be achieved at a lower level of
employment since firms find it more profitable to meet the rise in demand by inducing the
3workers to raise their (optimal) effort supply.  These two states are separated by a third, the
‘threshold effort’ state, which corresponds to the peak of the humped-shaped relationship
where the combination of employment and effort yields the maximum level of output.  In this
sense, therefore, in the ‘threshold effort’ state the economy may be said to be operating
without any slack despite the existence of a positive level of ‘involuntary’ unemployment.
Clearly, such an economy may experience multiple-equilibria.  We show that when the
economy is trapped in a ‘low-effort’ equilibrium, positive demand shocks can lead,
perversely, to an increase in unemployment 1.
To explore the extent to which the non-linearity predicted by the model is supported
by evidence, we examine the empirical relationship between unemployment rate and level of
output for data from the G7 countries.  Our empirical analysis is based on estimating a state
space ‘local linear trend’ model using the Kalman-filter.  This approach allows us to account
both for secular and cyclical variations and for changes in productivity of other factors, which
do not explicitly feature in the analysis.  Our evidence suggests that whilst ‘low-effort’
periods have occurred significantly within the sample, periods corresponding to ‘threshold
effort’ seem to dominate and only German data shows a strong support for more frequent
occurrence of the ‘high-effort’ case.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model and shows
how the non-linearity described above emerges and derives the typical fiscal policy multiplier
to illustrate the perverse policy effect.  Section 3 explains our econometric method and
reports the evidence for each of the G7 countries and Section 4 concludes the paper.  The
                                                
1 Other recent studies which examine the link between unemployment and productivity include Malley and
Moutos (2001), Leith and Li (2001), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Blanchard (1998), Caballero and
Hammour (1998a,b), Gordon (1997a) and Manning (1992).  However, none of these studies explores the link
between unemployment and output arising from both labour and product market imperfections.
4Appendix outlines the derivation of certain results, which are not explained within the main
body of the paper.
2. The Relationship between Output and Unemployment:  Theory
In this section we construct and analyse a stylised theoretical macro-model which is in the
tradition of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) but allows the economy to sustain some level of
unemployment in equilibrium.  More specifically, we endow the model with market
imperfections in both the labour and the goods market by assuming that monopolistically
competitive firms reward workers’ effort by paying efficiency wages.
Following the work of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Yellen (1984), a number of
models have employed some version of the efficiency wage hypothesis to study various
aspects of macroeconomic activity. Examples can found in: Agénor and Aizenman (1999)
and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) on fiscal and labour market policies; Andersen and
Rasmussen (1999), Pisauro (1991) and Carter (1999) on the role of the tax system; Leamer
(1999) on specialisation; Albrecht and Vroman (1996), Fehr (1991) and Smidt-Sørensen
(1990) on properties of labour demand; and Smidt-Sørensen (1991) on working hours.  In this
paper we employ a standard version of the hypothesis which postulates that workers can
adjust their effort supply in response to the wage and threat of losing their job.  But rather
than using a discrete choice between low and high effort levels we allow for the optimal
effort supply to be a continuous function of its determinants.
The model is static and describes an economy with three types of agents: firms,
households and a government. Firms are monopolistically competitive and each firm
produces one variety of a horizontally differentiated product using labour as input with an
increasing returns to scale technology.  Households are endowed with a unit of labour, which
5they supply inelastically. Unemployed households receive a benefit transfer from the
government.  The government revenue, raised by taxing the households, is used to subsidise
the unemployed and to pay for government consumption.  The final good in the economy is
the Dixit-Stiglitz CES bundle of horizontally differentiated varieties.
The demand side of the model consists of the households’ and government’s
consumption.  The latter is given by
PGdjgP
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Î
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where j is the index denoting a variety of the differentiated good, N  is the mass of varieties
on offer and Pj and gj are the price and quantity of variety j.  It is straightforward to show that
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where G is the corresponding CES bundle
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Note that the constant elasticity of substitution2 between any two varieties is given by s>1; P
is the price index dual to G; and (2) maximises G above subject to (1).
The government expenditure comprises (1) and the unemployment benefit payments
B per unemployed worker/household and is financed by a lump sum tax3, T.  Normalising the
number of households to unity and denoting the proportion of unemployed households by u,
the government budget constraint is written as
                                                
2 See Molana and Zhang (2001) for a study of the role of a variable elasticity of substitution, in the context of
fiscal policy effectiveness.  Note also that, following the common practice, the CES bundle is normalised by
the mass of varieties, N, to switch off the variety effect in the aggregate.
3 The use of a lump-sum tax is a common simplification in the literature, which reduces the distortionary role
of the government.  For further explanations see Molana and Moutos (1992), Heijdra and Van der Ploeg
(1996) and Heijdra, et al. (1998) among others.
6PG + uB = T.              (3)
Each household is endowed with one unit of labour and an initial money holdings of
M , and receives distributed profits P.  In addition, it also supplies, inelastically, its unit of
labour and at any point in time it can either be employed or be unemployed.  When
employed, a typical household works for a firm j, supplying the effort level ej>0 and earning
nominal wage Wj.  If unemployed, it receives from the government the nominal
unemployment benefit B at no effort.  Dropping the distinction between firms and setting
profit income to zero (anticipating the symmetric equilibrium and elimination of profits
through a free entry and exit process), a household’s budget constraint is
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where M is the desired stock of money and C is the aggregate CES bundle of N individual
varieties whose consumption is denoted by cj.  The latter  is determined according to the
following demand
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and P is the corresponding price index dual to C; (5) maximises C above subject to the
constraint  PCdjcP
Nj
jj =ò
Î
.
7Household’s utility is given by4
( ) ( )efPMCvV ×-= l/, ,                          (6)
where, in addition to the usual component v which we assume to be a Cobb-Douglas
function,
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the utility function also depends on the level of effort, e, that an employed household will
supply when working. The function ( ) 0³ef  captures the disutility of effort; l=1 for an
employed household; and l= 0 when the household is unemployed. Assuming that ( )ef  is
taken as given (see Appendix A.1 for further details on the relevance of these and the
derivation of the effort function) and maximising the utility function of an employed and an
unemployed household subject to their respective budget constraint yields their consumption
and money demand equations.  Using L to denote the proportions of employed and invoking
the normalisation
1=+ uL ,  (7)
the household sector’s aggregate consumption and money demand equations are
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4 For simplicity, like most studies we assume complete separation between households’ and government’s
consumption.  Therefore, government consumption does not appear in households’ utility function.  For some
exceptions see, for example, Molana and Moutos (1989), Heijdra et al (1998) and Reinhorn (1998) who
extend the original results by allowing for some substitution between the public and private consumption.
8Given the above, the aggregate demand for the CES bundle, facing the
monopolistically competitive firms, is Y = C+ G.  On the assumption that each firm produces
a distinct variety – given the incentive to specialise due to falling average costs explained low
– the demand function facing firm j is jjj gcy +=  which is obtained by adding (5) and (2)
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It is a straightforward exercise to show that P, Y and N satisfy the following
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Labour is assumed to be the only factor of production, and to be perfectly mobile
between firms.  Firm j’s technology is given by the following production function
f-= jjj Ley ,            (14)
where jL  is the variable labour input, ej is labour productivity and f is a constant parameter
reflecting the fixed cost of production assumed to be identical across firms. The increasing
returns to scale, implied by falling average cost, therefore gives rise to the incentive for full
specialisation from which a one-to-one correspondence between the mass of varieties and
firms results.
                                                
5 We have followed the existing studies in assuming that G and C are similar CES bundles. See Startz (1989),
Dixon and Lawler (1996), Heijdra and Van der Ploeg (1996) and Heijdra, et al. (1998) for further details.
9We assume that ej is determined by workers’ attitude towards shirking and represents
their optimal effort supply function, which depends on: i) the real value of the wage paid by
the firm, PWw jj /= ; ii) the real value of the unemployment benefit, b=B/P, which the
government transfers to the unemployed household; and iii) the extent of unemployment in
the economy captured by the unemployment rate6 u.  Thus, we postulate the following effort
supply function for a worker employed by firm j
),,( ubwee jj = ,                        (15)
which is assumed to satisfy the following properties: (i) bwasubwe jj ³³ 0),,(   and
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effort supply function, which satisfies the above properties and is obtained when workers
maximise their expected utility from work, is explicitly derived in Appendix A1).
Each individual firm takes P, Y, N, u and B as given and chooses its ‘efficiency wage’
jW  and its price jP  so as to maximise its profit
jjjjj LWyP -=p ,            (16)
subject to the demand function in (10) and the production function in (14) as well as taking
account of its workers’ reaction to the choice of Wj which is given by the effort function in
(15). The first order conditions are 0/ =jj W¶p¶  and 0/ =jj P¶p¶  whose solution imply
the following wage and price setting rules7
                                                
6 Given that the number of households is normalised to 1, u is simply the proportion of unemployed
households and is equivalent to the unemployment rate.
7 The second order conditions are satisfied as long as s>1 and 0<¢¢jwwe .
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Equation (17) is a well-known result in the efficiency wage literature and implies that
firms raise their wage rate up to the point where the effort function is unit elastic. Equation
(18) is the usual mark-up pricing rule for a monopolistically competitive firm. In a symmetric
equilibrium where all firms are identical, we drop the subscript j and write the above
equations as
ewubwew =×¢ ),,( ,           (17´)
and
wubwe s=),,( ,                      (18´)
where s = s/(s – 1).  To see the (partial equilibrium) implications of these, first note that
together they yield
s=¢ ),,( ubwew >1.               (19)
Next, totally differentiating (18´) and taking account of (19) implies
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which shows that an increase in the benefit rate raises the unemployment rate. Finally, totally
differentiating (17´) and (18´) and solving using (20) to eliminate db and dw yields (see
Appendix A2)
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Thus, under our assumptions regarding the shape of the effort function, (21) implies de/du >0
which is consistent with the theoretical consensus that the net result of an increase in
unemployment rate is to raise workers’ effort level.
We can use the above results to examine the way in which equilibrium output and
unemployment are related to each other on the supply side.  The symmetric equilibrium of the
industry is obtained when entry eliminates profits,
WLPYdj
Nj
j -==P ò
Î
p ,                      (22)
where ò
Î
=
Nj
jdjLL  is total employment. Thus, through free entry and exit process N adjusts to
ensure P = 0. Imposing this on (22) and solving for Y gives Y = wL, from which upon
substitution for w from (18´) we obtain
eLY
s
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Equation (23) may be interpreted as a ‘quasi-aggregate’ production function. It traces
the combinations of aggregate employment and output (L,Y) which satisfy the supply side
equilibrium in which labour productivity is determined by an effort supply function and firms
pay wages to induces workers to supply the effort level that maximises their profits. Or, put
differently, these combinations give the equilibrium locus that describes how Y changes as
firms and workers respond to changes in u while the wage is adjusted to ensure the resulting
effort supply maximises profits. Totally differentiating (23) and noting that dL= – du from
(7), we obtain
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Thus, provided that de/du in (21) is finite as 1®u , we would expect the right-hand-side of
(24) to be negative for sufficiently large levels of u.  Conversely, starting from sufficiently
low levels of u, we would expect the right-hand-side of (24) to be positive as long as de/du in
(21) is positive, as explained above. Given these and assuming that de/du in (21) is
continuous in u, the equilibrium locus in (u, Y) space may be depicted as in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The Relationship between Output
and Unemployment with Efficiency Wages
     Y
    Y
    0Y
        0       lu           u            hu      u®1
The main implication of the model that we wish to stress is that it results in a change
in dY/du from negative to positive as unemployment rate falls below a certain threshold,
uu = .  This is the rate of unemployment at which output attains its highest level, YY = . At
such a point, the economy may be said to be operating without any slack despite supporting a
level of ‘involuntary’ unemployment.  Within the region where uu > , the economy exhibits
the characteristics consistent with Okun’s Law since output and unemployment rate are
negatively related.  This situation corresponds to the ‘high-effort’ state where the economy
can be said to be operating ‘efficiently’ and firms will have to employ more workers to meet
a rise in aggregate demand.  In contrast, the region where uu <  corresponds to the ‘low-
effort’ state in which the economy may be said to be operating ‘inefficiently’.  In this
situation a higher level of output can be achieved at a lower level of employment since firms
13
will find it more profitable to meet the rise in demand by inducing the workers to raise their
(optimal) effort supply.  It is clear that in such an economy firms will (rationally) produce the
same level of output, Y0 say, employing either (1 – lu ) inefficient workers or (1 – hu )
efficient workers.  Thus, multiple-equilibria can arise given the non-linear nature of the
relationship between output and employment.  As a result, the effect of a policy shock on
employment and output depends on the initial equilibrium and unemployment can fall in the
event of a positive shock only if the economy is operating in the ‘high-effort’ state.  It can be
easily shown that the (tax financed) fiscal multiplier is given by (see Appendix A3 for
details),
S
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Y
YdG
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1
,              (25)
where DY ¢  and SY ¢  are the slopes of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply functions in
(P, Y) space, respectively.  While  DY ¢  < 0 always holds, SY ¢ can be positive or negative within
the framework developed above 8.  Therefore, the effect of a fiscal expansion depends on the
size and sign of the ratio of the slopes of the two functions.  In particular, in the ‘high-effort’
state when SY ¢  >0 the multiplier will – as in the recent new Keynesian studies of the effect of
fiscal policy – lie between zero and unity.  But when the economy is operating in the ‘low-
effort’ state and SY ¢  <0, the multiplier may either exceed unity or be negative (which
resemble, respectively, the multipliers obtained under the typical Keynesian case and  when
more than full crowding out occurs). However, the former case, in which the rise in output
will be accompanied by a fall in employment, corresponds to an unstable initial equilibrium
                                                
8 It is a straightforward exercise to show that the aggregate supply function in (P,Y) space is non-linear and can
have more than one intersection with the aggregate demand. In such a situation, the equilibrium occurring
where the aggregate demand curve is flatter than the (downward sloping) aggregate supply curve will be
unstable (see Appendix A3 for further details on the slopes of aggregate demand and supply curves).
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where – SY ¢ > – DY ¢ >0 whereas in the latter case  – DY ¢ >– SY ¢  >0 and the initial equilibrium is
stable.
3. Evidence
To empirically assess the implications of the model outlined in the previous section,
regarding the relationship between output and unemployment rate, we have examined data on
the level of output and the rate of unemployment from G7 countries – Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US.  More specifically, we have explored the strength of
evidence to address the following questions:
(i) Does an ‘inversed U-shape’ specification adequately explain the way output is
related to unemployment rate?
(ii) If so, then how does the ‘threshold rate of unemployment’ – the rate at which
peak output occurs and which, according to our model, separates ‘low-effort’
from ‘high-effort’ states of production – vary over time?
(iii) How does the actual rate of unemployment compare with the ‘threshold rate of
unemployment’ intertemporally?
To tackle this task, we have estimated a state space ‘local linear trend’ model using
the Kalman-filter approach (see Harvey, 1989, for details), consisting of
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( )21 ,0~; hshhff iidntttt += - ,            (29)
and
( )21 ,0~; ysyydd iidntttt += - .            (30)
To capture the main feature of the non-linearity implied by the model, the
measurement equation (for output, y) in (26) is assumed to be a quadratic function9 (of the
unemployment rate, u) subject to an additive random shock, e, and with randomly evolving
(state) parameters ( )dfba ,,, .  The shock e is assumed to be drawn independently from a
normal distribution and the evolution process over time postulated for the state vector
( )tttt dfba ,,,  is described by the transition equations (27)-(30).  The generality allowed by
this set up is particularly useful when it is applied to bivariate relationships which both: (a)
involve variables that have strong secular pattern and/or are subject to cyclical fluctuations 10;
and (b) are, by construction, restricted and fail to condition explicitly on a host of other
potentially relevant variables11.  The state-space representations, in this context, are very
flexible since the non-stationary processes generating tf  and td  are allowed to evolve in a
manner capable of capturing any fundamental changes, which may have occurred in the
historical relationship between yt and ut.  Moreover, to account for trends in output growth
and the unemployment rate over our estimation period (1960-2001), we have allowed for
local linear trends where both the level, 1ta -  and the slope, 1tb -  vary over time (see Harvey,
                                                
9 While there are a wide variety of alternative non-linear functions capable of capturing the non-monotonic
link between yt and ut predicted by our theory, we have opted for the simplest and most parsimonious of
these.
10 Both output and unemployment have these properties and the estimation method adopted here is a superior
alternative to isolating the secular and cyclical components by filtering the series before checking how they
relate to each other over time.
11 In the absence of any explicit dynamics, we employ contemporaneous values of both output and the
unemployment rate.  This approach might reasonably be expected to yield biased parameter estimates, given
the joint endogenity of the variables.  To assess the extent of this bias we also experimented with IV and
GMM estimation and found any biases to be quantitatively negligible. To preserve space, these latter results
are not reported here but will be made available on request.
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1989, for details)12.  To estimate (26) allowing for (27)-(30), we require starting values for
the state vector and its variance-covariance matrix, ( )0000 ,,, dfba  and P0.  In the absence of
any prior information on the initial distribution13, we have employed a diffuse prior which
involves setting the starting values of the coefficients equal to zero and letting P0 = I l, where
I is the conformable unit matrix and l is a very large number (see Harvey, 1989, pg. 121).
Empirical support for our theory, within the context of the questions (i) and (ii) posed
above, at the beginning of this section, requires that:
(i)¢ tf  must be significantly greater than zero, td  must be significantly less than
zero, and the estimated residuals, teˆ , must be stationary and unpredictable;
(ii)¢ The ‘threshold rate of unemployment’, denoted by tu  and given by
)2/( tttu df -=  from the quadratic function in (26), should be significantly
greater than zero.
To examine these, we obtained filtered estimates of the state vector for each of the G7
countries. Data are quarterly over the period 1960:Q1-2001:Q1 except the French data which
do not start until 1964:Q4 and the results are reported in Table 1 below.  Columns (I) and
(III) give, for t = T, the filtered estimates of tf  and td , and column (V) gives the
corresponding estimate for the threshold rate of unemployment, )2/( tttu df -= . Columns
(II), (IV) and (VI) report, respectively, the proportions of estimates within the sample period
for which the following null hypotheses cannot be rejected at the 5% critical level:
0;0;0 ><> ttt udf . Table 2 reports estimates of autocorrelation and partial
                                                
12 Note that in contrast to the other parameters which follow random walks, tb  is assumed to follow a
stationary AR(1) process.  This assumption is employed since a non-stationary process for this parameter
would imply yt ~ I(2).  This, however, is against the widely acknowledged stylised fact that the growth rate of
output is stationary, which is also supported by our data set.  For example, univariate evidence based on
ADF, weighted-symmetric and Phillips-Perron tests suggest that yt has only one unit root (this evidence is not
presented here but will be make available on request).
13 Given that three of the four transition equations are non-stationary, the unconditional distribution of the state
vector is not defined.
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autocorrelation coefficients, denoted by AC and PAC respectively, for 8 lags for the
estimated residuals. These results suggest that the quadratic specification adequately captures
the non-linear shape of the relationship between output and unemployment rate predicted by
our model, beyond any co- or counter-movements due to secular and/or cyclical patterns in
the underlying series.  Recall that this type of non-linear specification implies that at any
point in time the economy can be in one of the following three possible states: tt uu < ,
tt uu =  and tt uu > .  However, as we have pointed out, the standard explanations – such as
Okun’s Law which predict a trade off between output and unemployment – would imply a
monotonic negative relationship between yt and ut hence requiring, within our framework,
that the actual rate of unemployment is always above the threshold rate, i.e. tt uu > .  Such
explanations therefore cannot account for the significant occurrence of  tt uu <  or  tt uu = .
To see how ut compares with tu , in Figure 2 below we illustrate the frequency of the
occurrence of each of the three states for each country.  The graphs show the ratio of the
actual unemployment rate to the estimated threshold rate for each period, i.e. tt uu ˆ/ , and the
table in the bottom-right corner gives the percentage of significant occurrence of each state at
5% and 10% critical level.  These results show that whilst the evidence that tt uu <  has
occurred significantly at some periods cannot be ruled out, periods in which tt uu =  seem to
dominate and only German data shows a strong support for tt uu > .
Finally, we note that our evidence is in line with the findings reported by studies that
have examined the behaviour of labour productivity in the industrialised countries and
provide evidence on the way in which labour productivity has changed over the last few
decades.  Recent examples include Disney, et al. (2000), Barnes and Haskel (2000), Marini
and Scaramozzino (2000), Bart van Ark et al. (2000) and Sala-i-Martin (1996).  However, the
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evidence provided in these studies is usually interpreted using one of the micro-theory based
explanations underlying the behaviour of labour productivity. These may, in general, be
divided into two categories. The first concentrates on the productivity gains that can be
realised through: i) improved skill due to training; ii) increased efficiency due to progress in
management and restructuring; and iii) rising physical productivity of other factors of
production due to R&D, etc.. The second category emphasises market forces and sees
competition and market selection as the main motivation behind the rise in efficiency. The
separating line between these two accounts is not very clear in the sense that the second will
have to be achieved through the first when the economy is operating efficiently. However, if
the economy happens to be in an inefficient phase, market forces can act directly without
having to induce any of the factors in the first category. The efficiency wage hypothesis is a
typical example of this case.
4. Summary and Conclusions
The main motivating factor underlying our study has been the possibility that a positive
policy shock might give rise to adverse employment effects.  This result is unlikely if Okun’s
Law holds and output and unemployment rate are always related positively, once we take
account of secular and cyclical changes.  We outline a simple theoretical setting which can
account for deviations from Okun’s Law.  We show that, if at high unemployment rates firms
can induce workers to supply more effort, the equilibrium relationship between aggregate
output and unemployment rate can be positive provided the gain in productivity is
sufficiently large to outweigh the negative effect of the reduction in employment.  Our
evidence, based on data from G7 countries over the period 1960-2001, shows strong support
for deviation from Okun’s Law.  Using an estimation method which allows for trends,
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cyclical changes and breaks, we find that only German data strongly favour a persistent
negative relationship between the level of output and rate of unemployment.
Clearly, our results – which complement those of the literature on the effects of
contractionary fiscal policy (see, for details, Barry and Devereux, 1995) and on the positive
effects of unemployment insurance (see Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000) – suggest that
plausible circumstances do exist in which market imperfections pose serious obstacles to the
smooth working of expansionary and/or stabilization policies.  We show that the economy
can rationally operate at an inefficient equilibrium, and that positive demand shocks in such
circumstances will have perverse effects.  Accordingly, we conclude by stressing Lindbeck’s
(1992) concerns about the effectiveness of macroeconomic stabilisation policy in the
presence of labour and product market imperfection, which are echoed by our results.   
Finally, given our definition of the threshold rate of unemployment and the evidence
that in a number of countries the actual unemployment rate has a tendency to coincide with a
time varying estimate of such a threshold rate, exploring the links between the latter and the
time-varying NAIRU (see Gordon, 1997b for details) can throw light on the determination of
the natural rate of output and hence provides an interesting direction for future research.
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6. Appendix
A1. Derivation of the Effort Supply Function e(w, u, b)
This appendix explains how a specific effort supply function such as that in equation (15) can
be derived within the framework of the efficiency wage hypothesis where, following
common practice, the agent is assumed to maximise the expected utility of remaining in
employment.
We assume that all households participate in the labour market and at any point in
time a household can be in one of the following states: (i) employed (working); (ii) being
fired (when caught shirking at work); (iii) unemployed (being without a job); or (iv) being
hired (finding a job).  Let the utility indices corresponding to of the above states be denoted
as follows:
(i) employed (working): VE
(ii) being fired (losing one’s job): VF
(iii) unemployed (being without a job): VU
(iv) being hired (finding a job): VH
VU and VE can be obtained as follows.  Disregarding the money holdings and taxes
(which are the same for all states) and focusing on unemployment benefit or wage as the only
source of work-related income, the utility function in equation (6) implies that the indirect
utility of an unemployed and an employed household is, respectively,
P/BV U = ,                     (A1.1)
and
( ) )(/ efPWV E -= .                              (A1.2)
While (A1.1) is straightforward, (A1.2) needs some explanation regarding f(e).  We shall
assume 0>¢f  and 0³¢¢f  which implies that the disutility of effort rises with a non-
decreasing rate.  In particular, we shall use the explicit form 2)( keef =  where k>0 is a
scaling factor.
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Finally, we need to specify VH, which is the satisfaction a household attaches to
finding a job or being hired.  But the utility associated with this state is in principle not
distinguishable from VE and for simplicity we let
VH = VE,        (A1.3)
The probabilities associated with moving from one state to another are assumed to be
determined as follows:
(a) Probability associated with being fired when shirking, F.
We assume that shirking is the only reason for being fired (we do not explicitly model the
monitoring technology).  Therefore, ceteris paribus, F is a monotonic function of the effort
level, e. Thus,
( ) ( ) ( ) 0;01;10; <===
de
dF
FFeFF .
For simplicity, normalise the maximum possible effort to unity and let
F = 1 – e.        (A1.4)
(b) Probability associated with finding a job, or being hired, when unemployed, H.
We assume that the labour force is homogeneous and, ceteris paribus, H is a monotonic
function of the unemployment rate, u (we do not explicitly model the search technology).
Thus,
( ) ( ) ( ) 0;01;10; <=£=
du
dH
HHuHH .
For simplicity we let
H = 1 – u.        (A1.5)
We define the optimal level of effort as that which maximises a household’s expected
utility of remaining in employment. The latter is denoted by R(e) and is, by definition, given
by
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R(e) = (1 – F)VE + FVF.        (A1.6)
Also, given that a ‘fired’ worker can either be hired or remain unemployed, we let VF be a
weighted average of VH  and  VU. Thus,
VF = HVH + (1 – H)VU.        (A1.7)
Equations (A1)-(A7) yield
( ) ( )( )ubkewuekeweeR +---+-= 22 )1()1()( ,
where w=W/P and b=B/P. This equation can be rearranged as
( )ubwuebwukeuukeeR +-+-+---= )1()()1()( 23 .        (A1.8)
The agent takes (w, b, u) as given and chooses e to maximise R(e).  The first order
condition for this is ( ) ( ) 0)(3/1/)1)(3/2(2 =-+--- bwkeuue .  This has two roots of which
only one is positive, which also satisfies the second order for a maximum and can, after some
normalisation, be written as
u
u
u
u
bwe
-
-
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -+-=
11
)(
2
1
2
g ,        (A1.9)
where g =3k. It is clear that equation (A1.9) satisfies our specified conditions, since
bwasubwe ³³ 0),,( ; bwasuubwe =Î"= )1,0(0),,( ; 0>=¢
w
e
ew ¶
¶
;
0<=¢
b
e
eb ¶
¶
;  0>=¢
u
e
eu ¶
¶
;  02
2
<=¢¢
w
e
eww ¶
¶
;  0
2
>=¢¢
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e
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¶
; and  0
2
>=¢¢
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e
euw ¶¶
¶
.
A2. Derivation of Equations (20) and (21).
We use the following equations (15), (17´), (18´) and (19) which are reproduced below as
(A2.1)-(A2.4), respectively,
),,( ubwee = ,                   (A2.1)
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ewubwew =×¢ ),,( ,        (A2.2)
wubwe s=),,( ,                   (A2.3)
s=¢ ),,( ubwew .           (A2.4)
First, totally differentiating (A2.3) yields
dwduedbedwe ubw s=¢+¢+¢ ,          (A2.5)
and substituting from (A2.4), i.e. s=¢we , in (A2.5) we obtain
0=¢+¢ duedbe ub ,          (A2.6)
which is solved to yield equation (20).
Next, totally differentiating (A2.4) implies
0=¢¢+¢¢+¢¢ duedbedwe uwbwww ,         (A2.7)
and using (A2.6) to eliminate db we have
0=¢¢+÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
¢
¢
-¢¢+¢¢ duedu
e
e
edwe uw
b
u
bwww ,         (A2.8)
which can be solved for dw to give
due
e
e
e
e
dw uw
b
u
bw
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û
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è
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1 ,         (A2.9)
Substituting from (A2.9) into de = s dw  implied by (A2.3), we obtain equation (21).
A3. Derivation of the Fiscal Multiplier, Equation (25).
We derive the fiscal multiplier as follows. First, the aggregate demand function (AD) is
derived by noting that  Y = C + G, where C is obtained by solving equations (8) and (9), i.e.
[ ]( )PMC /)1/( aa -= . Hence,
P
M
GY ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-
+=
a
a
1
       (A3.1)
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Totally differentiating (A3.1), for any give M , then implies that on AD,
dP
P
M
dGdY ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
-= 2)1( a
a
.        (A3.2)
Next, recalling from equations (23) and (7) that Y = wL  and L= 1 – u,  we obtain, on the
aggregate supply (AS) side, Y = w(1 – u), which can be totally differentiated to yield
dY = (1 – u)dw – wdu,        (A3.3)
which upon substitution from (A2.9) can be written as,
duwe
e
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e
e
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Also, using (A2.6) and the fact that for any given B, dP
P
B
db 2-= , we obtain
dP
P
B
e
e
du
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= 2 ,          (A3.5)
which can be substituted in (A3.4) to give the reaction of output to a change in the price level
on the aggregate supply (AS),
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Simplifying notation and writing (A3.2) and (A3.6) as
dPYdY
dGdPYdY
S
D
¢=
+¢=
where DY ¢  and SY ¢  are the slopes of AD and AS in (P, Y) space. Solving the above to eliminate
dP  we obtain the fiscal multiplier in equation (25), namely,
S
D
Y
YdG
dY
¢
¢
-
=
1
1
.         (A3.5)
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Table 1. Selected Results from Estimation of Equation (25)
based on G7 data for 1964(1)-2001(1)
(I)
Tfˆ
(II)
% over sample for
which 0>tf  is
not rejected at 5%.
(III)
Tdˆ
(IV)
% over sample for
which 0>td  is
not rejected at 5%.
(V)
tuˆ
(VI)
% over sample for
which 0>tu  is not
rejected at 5%.
US 2.49(0.232) 100%
-0.250
(0.036) 100%
5.62
[1.21] 100%
Canada 2.26(0.223) 100%
-0.124
(0.022) 100%
9.14
[2.26] 92%
UK 2.47(0.640) 100%
-0.158*
(0.178) 100%
8.02*
[5.03] 95%
France 4.73(0.776) 100%
-0.258
(0.124) 100%
9.13
[2.13] 80%
Germany 21.06(4.60) 100%
-2.47
(0.593) 100%
4.26
[0.07] 100%
Italy 4.75(0.560) 100%
-0.224
(0.082) 100%
10.58
[2.77] 98%
Japan 4.26(1.04) 100%
-0.585
(0.231) 96%
3.65
[0.59] 85%
Notes:
(a)  The initial 4 years (16 observations) were used to allow the filtered estimates sufficient time to stabilise and
were excluded in obtaining estimates in this table.
(b) The statistical significances of 
tˆ
f  and 
tˆ
d  are based on their asymptotic standard errors. The numbers in
parenthesis are the asymptotic standard errors for the final state vector, t = T .
(c) To assess the statistical significance of tˆu  on a period-by-period basis we have conducted a parametric
bootstrap using 2000 replications for each quarter. The numbers is square brackets are the bootstrapped
standard errors for the final period.
(d) An asterisk indicates not significant at the 5% level.
(e) The local linear trend components were not significant for German data and hence were excluded in final
estimation for that country.
Table 2: Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Coefficients
for the Estimated Residuals of Equation (25)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
AC 0.596 0.305 0.107 -0.12 -0.216 -0.141 -0.173 -0.173US  PAC 0.596 -0.077 -0.066 -0.217 -0.048 0.105 -0.152 -0.067
AC 0.809 0.59 0.377 0.17 0.073 0.029 0.003 -0.021Canada  PAC 0.809 -0.19 -0.111 -0.142 0.164 0.009 -0.04 -0.084
AC 0.274 -0.104 -0.009 0.112 0.018 -0.141 -0.082 0.114UK
 PAC 0.274 -0.194 0.088 0.077 -0.042 -0.117 -0.006 0.11
AC 0.653 0.353 0.239 0.09 0.036 0.11 0.09 0.09France  PAC 0.653 -0.127 0.109 -0.155 0.083 0.129 -0.074 0.084
AC 0.599 0.105 -0.006 0.085 -0.005 -0.14 -0.184 -0.12Germany  PAC 0.599 -0.395 0.264 -0.005 -0.226 0.055 -0.138 0.025
AC 0.147 0.276 0.128 -0.031 0.103 -0.13 0.172 0.042Italy  PAC 0.147 0.26 0.065 -0.134 0.076 -0.127 0.196 0.052
AC 0.001 -0.044 0.105 -0.091 0.038 -0.022 -0.112 -0.085Japan
 PAC 0.001 -0.044 0.106 -0.096 0.051 -0.045 -0.088 -0.106
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Figure 2: Relationship between Actual and Threshold Unemployment Rates
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